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Abstract 
 
 Throughout the developing world, many water distribution systems are unreliable. 
As a result, it becomes necessary for each household to store its own water as a hedge 
against this uncertainty. Since arrivals of water are not synchronized across households, 
serious distributional inefficiencies arise. We develop a model describing the optimal 
intertemporal depletion of each household’s private water storage when it is uncertain 
when water will next arrive to replenish supplies. The model is calibrated using survey 
data from Mexico City, a city where many households store water in sealed rooftop tanks 
known as tinacos. The calibrated model is used to evaluate the potential welfare gains 
that would occur if alternative modes of water provision were implemented. We estimate 
that most of the potential distributional inefficiencies can be eliminated simply by making 
the frequency of deliveries the same across households which now face haphazard 
deliveries. This would require neither costly investments in infrastructure nor price 
increases. 
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1. Introduction 
 Households in developed countries typically have immediate access to as much 
water as they can afford. In the developing world, however, the supply of water is more 
haphazard. In many areas, households store up water when it arrives and consume out of 
their own inventories until they are re-supplied by truck or other means. In Onitsha, 
Nigeria, for example, an elaborate vending system involving tanker trucks supplying 
households with storage capabilities is used for those who do not have indoor plumbing.2 
In Accra, Ghana, a similar system is used with tanker trucks. Again, water deliveries are 
uncertain and households respond by storing water.3 Even among households with piped 
water, there is often uncertainty about water availability. In the cities of Bandung and 
Jakarta Indonesia, residents store water in tanks called torens in response to unreliable 
municipal water service.  When their tanks run empty, they pay for water to be delivered 
by trucks. In Lima, Peru, 48% of households receive water only during limited hours and 
supply interruptions are common.4  In Mexico City, 32% of households report receiving 
water during only limited hours and most residents suffer routine supply interruptions. 
Indeed, some residents in the southern and southeastern portions of the city receive water 
less than once per week.5 In these contexts uncertainty arises due to limited water 
availability at the source, mechanical failures, human error, and other factors.  
While these systems avoid the large fixed costs required to eliminate the supply 
uncertainty, they are not without their own significant costs. If a family in the developed 
world can consume as much water as it needs at price p Pesos per thousand liters, then it 
will increase its consumption to the point where an additional liter of water would yield 
an additional benefit just equal to p Pesos per thousand liters. Since this is true for every 
family, there would be no additional gains from inter-family trade. That is, there will 
never be a situation where one family would value an additional liter of water more than 
another family since every family would value its last drop at p. In the developing world 
however, distributional inefficiencies (allocations in which individuals value water 
                                                 
2 Whittington, Dale. Lauria, Donald T. A Study of Water Vending and Willingness to Pay for Water in 
Onitsha, Nigeria. World Development, Vol. 19, No. 2/3, pp. 179-198, 1991. 
3 Porter (1997). 
4 Alcázar, Xu and Zuluaga (2002). 
5 Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga (2002) also report that nine out of sixteen delegations in Mexico City 
routinely suffer cuts in service. 
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differently at the margin) abound. One family may value water more because the family 
has a smaller storage tank or was not re-supplied as recently. One family may be 
rationing its water usage tightly  while another is allocating its surplus water to frivolous 
uses. And yet it would be difficult for the parched family to acquire the water the other 
family is wasting. So each system has its own costs. 
 In many countries, some fraction of the population has access to water at all hours 
while the remaining fraction must store water between irregular deliveries. How large 
would the benefits be if everyone storing water received it after the same fixed interval? 
How large would the distributional gains be if everyone had access to water at all hours? 
In this paper, we propose a methodology to answer these questions and show how to 
apply it. Answering these questions is difficult for two reasons. At the conceptual level, 
we must determine the best consumers can do in the current environment where there is 
uncertainty about when water will next arrive. At the empirical level, we must find a way 
to calibrate our conceptual model to real-world data despite their limitations. The 
methodology we develop is general. For concreteness and illustrative purposes, however, 
we focus on its application to Mexico City. 
The framework described in the paper applies to households that receive water 
infrequently and have the means to store it. Our paper examines the case where municipal 
water is delivered by trucks, pipes, or some other form of public distribution.6 In 
addition, this framework could be used to model consumption decisions for households 
that rely on stored rainwater. We proceed as follows. In section 2, we describe the 
conceptual model used to examine the welfare costs of unreliable water service. In 
section 3, we discuss properties of the model. In section 4, the model is calibrated with 
available data from Mexico City and is used to show the distributional benefits of 
alternative regimes of water provision.  Section 5 concludes. 
                                                
 
 
6 Our framework also applies to households that access water from a well, pond, river, or other readily 
available water source.  Although typically these households do not face uncertainty about water 
availability, the high fixed cost of collecting water induces them to store it.  See, for example, Kremer, 
Leino, Miguel and Zwane (2006). Our model describes the optimal depletion of private water storage over 
time for these households.  Our model does not apply to households that are unable to store water because 
they lack the necessary materials or cannot afford them. These households are unable to smooth water 
consumption at all, making uncertainty in water provision even more important than in the case we 
consider here. 
 3
2. The Model 
 To understand the best way to deplete stored water when there is re-supply 
uncertainty, we formulate a model. This model allows us to quantify the social costs 
imposed by water service uncertainty. Unsure of when they will be resupplied, 
households use less water than they would if water were always available at the same 
price. In addition, to avoid running out of stored water and having to rely on alternative, 
more expensive sources, households do not consume at a constant rate but tailor their 
consumption to the realized delay since their last resupply of water.  
Let U(c) denote household utility from consuming c units of water in a particular 
period and assume the utility function is strictly increasing and strictly concave. Let C  
denote total household storage capacity.  Let p denote the price per liter of water fixed by 
the municipality and paid at the time that water is replenished. Let β  denote the 
exogenous discount factor between periods. 
In some specifications, we will assume that households have access to an 
emergency water source in which water can be purchased at price pˆ >p.  For example, 
this could be the price of private water delivered by truck or the implicit price of finding 
and boiling one’s own water for consumption.  It is assumed that emergency water and 
water from storage are perfect substitutes. Since emergency water is more expensive, it 
will only be used if a household runs out of stored municipal water.  We also assume for 
simplicity that there is no fixed cost associated with using emergency consumption and 
that it must be paid for at the time of purchase. Since it is always available at a fixed price 
( pˆ ), emergency water is never stored. 
There is uncertainty about whether or not municipal water will be available in a 
particular period.  If water is available in that period, the household fills its storage tank 
and then consumes as much water from it as desired.  If water is not available, the 
household must consume water out of its storage tank or from the emergency source.   
Denote the conditional probability that water is available during a particular 
period i as :1i i nα ≤ ≤ . The parameter iα  represents the “hazard rate” – the probability 
that there is water service in period i conditional on no water service in the previous i-1 
periods. For example, if there has been no water service for six consecutive periods, then 
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7α denotes the probability that there will be water service in the seventh period. We 
require 1nα =  for some exogenous integer n. This implies that, given that no water has 
arrived in the previous n-1 consecutive periods, it is certain that additional water will 
arrive in the next period.  Whenever water arrives, the stochastic process of arrivals 
restarts. In particular, this means that the probability of water service directly following a 
period with service is 1α . 
 For convenience we also define, 
            1 1γ α= ;      
1
1
(1 ) for 2,...,
i
j
j
i nα−
=
= − =∏i iγ α
as a discrete probability distribution that water service next becomes available in period i, 
where i is the ith period following the last arrival. For example, 7γ  is the probability that 
water service next becomes available on the 7th period after the last arrival. 
Households must decide how much water to consume in each period.  Let  
denote the amount of water the household consumes in a period with water service and 
let denote its consumption if there has been no water service for the 
previous i-1 periods.  We consider the present-value of any contingent consumption 
strategy which the consumer would recommence every time water is delivered. From 
this, we can derive both the best such strategy and the discounted expected value of 
pursuing it indefinitely.  
0c
 (for 1c i ,...,i = 1)n −
 The discounted expected value of any repeated contingent consumption strategy 
will be denoted V. We assume that each household begins period zero with a full storage 
tank and require each consumer to refill his tank to capacity each time the opportunity to 
do so arises. We will discuss the circumstances under which refilling to the full capacity 
is optimal and will assume that these prevail. We also assume that, unless emergency 
supplies are utilized, each household must consume from its own storage tank and not 
directly from source of resupply or from a neighbor. 
 The present value of any repeated contingent strategy can then be written as: 
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where denote consumption of stored water and emergency water, respectively, i 
periods since the last resupply. 
  and 
e
ic
 
Equation (1) has the following interpretation. Emergency water may be acquired and 
consumed in any period at price pˆ . Municipal water is re-supplied in the jth period with 
probability  (for 1,..., )j j nγ = , and in that event the agent receives the discounted utility 
of consumption from period 0 through j-1 (net of the present cost of replacing the 
cumulative consumption in period j)  plus the value of starting with a full tank at j and 
continuing to use the contingent strategy forever after. Summing and solving for V, we 
obtain:  
 
(2) 
1
1 0
1
ˆ{ [ ( ) ] }
.
1
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i e e j
j i i i
j i
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The numerator of this expression is simply the expected sum of discounted 
utilities, net of re-supply charges, in a single round (from one period of resupply to the 
next). The denominator, which is independent of , inflates the expected payoff from 
one round to obtain the payoff into the infinite future.  
ic
 
 
 
  If agents are utility-maximizers, they will choose the contingent 
consumption strategy to maximize the expected present value (V) subject to 
the constraint that the sum of contingent consumptions of water in storage 
cannot exceed the capacity (C ) of the storage tank: 
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where V is defined in equation (2).  Since the objective function is strictly concave 
and the constraint set is convex, there is a unique global optimum. At the optimum, 
no emergency water is consumed  
in any period i if . In these periods solve  ˆ'( ) 0ei iU c c p+ − < 0 and 0 must ei ic c= >
both the constraint 
1
0
0
n
i
i
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−
=
− =∑  and the following recursion: 
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, the recursive equation simplifies to the following: 
1 1 1'( ) [ (1 ) '( )] for i 0,..., 2i i i iU c p U c nβ α α+ + += + − = −  and  1
0
.
n
i
i
c C
−
=
=∑   7
  
This recursive equation makes intuitive sense. It requires that the marginal cost of 
consuming one less unit of stored water in any period i (the left-hand side) equals the 
discounted expected marginal benefit of having that extra water available in the next 
period (the right-hand side). This expected marginal benefit is the probability-weighted 
average of (1) the reduced expense of having to acquire a little less water to fill the 
storage tank if water becomes available and (2) the marginal utility of consuming the 
additional water saved from the previous period if service remains unavailable. 
                                                 
7 This recursive equation arises in other models where a storable resource is extracted in anticipation of an 
arrival that will induce more rapid depletion. In the case of Salant and Henderson (1978), for example, 
government gold sales are anticipated to arrive at some unknown date in the future; in the case of Long 
(1975) nationalization is anticipated to occur at an unknown date. Unlike these papers, the present 
formulation envisions not just a single arrival but an infinitely-repeated sequence of arrivals. Since the 
recursive equation is the same in the two papers, however, its implications are the same and we mention 
them only briefly below.  
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The recursive equation implies that the marginal utility of consumption grows 
over time. But since a necessary condition for optimality is that , 
marginal utility cannot exceed the emergency price, 
ˆ'( ) 0ei iU c c p+ − ≤
ˆ.p  At that point, it is optimal for the 
agent to switch to emergency water and  U c ˆ'( 0p)ei ic+ − =  thereafter until the next 
delivery of municipal water. In continuous time, there would be no measurable interval 
where both stored water and emergency water were used at the same time. In our 
discrete-time formulation, there may be at most one transition period in which water from 
both sources is used but only if the marginal utility of consumption in that period is 
exactly pˆ . 
For any arbitrary level of consumption in period zero, the recursion describes 
consumption (contingent on the failure of new supplies to arrive) in all future periods 
until the “backstop” price pˆ  is reached, after which emergency water will be utilized. 
The requirement that the contingent consumptions sum to the initial inventory of water 
uniquely determines the initial consumption and hence the whole path. 
   
3. Properties of the Model 
3.1 How Periodic but Certain Deliveries Affect Depletion of Stored Water 
In the special case where water is certain to arrive in the next period ( 1 1γ = ), no 
emergency water is consumed 0( 0
ec )= . Under the circumstances prevailing in Mexico 
City and elsewhere,  a household cannot store even as much water as it would consume in 
one day (at the same price) if water was always available. If one is certain of delivery the 
next day, it is optimal to consume the entire inventory on the day of delivery 0 =( )c C . 
The payoff from doing so collapses to ( ) ,
1
U C p CV ββ
−= −  which is strictly increasing in 
C  since argmax  ( )cC U c pcβ< − . Hence, even if water is delivered every day, storage 
capacity limits consumption. 
 
  If water is sure to arrive on day n (>1) and not before ( ( 1 for 1)n nγ = > ), then for  
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marginal utilities below the emergency price, the recursion requires that 
1'( ) '( ) for 0,..., 2.i iU c U c i nβ += = −
)
 This “certainty case’’ coincides with the standard 
model of an agricultural good where harvests of the same size arrive periodically and 
must be stored within the season until the next harvest arrives. The household consumes 
stored water so that the discounted value of additional consumption is equalized across 
periods. If the household does not discount future payoffs ( 1β = , it is optimal to 
consume at the constant rate of /c C= n
)
 in each period. The longer the interval between 
refills, the smaller is daily consumption.  If the household discounts future payoffs ( 1β < , 
it consumes a portion of the initial inventory on the first day ( 0'( ) '( )U c U C pβ> > ) and 
successively less in future periods 1( ic c+ )i<  so that marginal utility increases by the 
factor 1β − (>1). The longer the interval between refills (n), the smaller will be 
consumption in each period since the unchanged supplies ( )C  have to last longer.8 
 
3.2 How Uncertainty Affects Depletion of Stored Water 
 
If there is some chance that water may arrive before day n, the recursion requires 
that marginal utility rise over time by strictly more than the interest factor: 
1 1
1
1 1
'( ) '( ) '( ) '( )'( ) ,
(1 ) (1 )
i i i i i i
i
i i
U c p U c U c U cU c βα αβ α β α β
+ +
+
+ +
− −= > =− −  
                                                 
8 As we will see in the simulations which follow, the introduction of uncertainty always reduces welfare. 
This result follows unless households discount the future so heavily that they put more weight on a chance 
early arrival of water than on the painful consequences of a later arrival. While this counterintuitive result 
never arises in the our application, it might arise in situations where a much longer time scale is involved 
(for example, Europe's resupplying of early settlements in North America in the past or the resupplying of 
space missions in the future). 
 9
where the inequality follows from the assumption that resupply may occur in the next 
period 1( i 0)α + > , that marginal utility is monotonically increasing and that storage 
capacity is limited and fully utilized 0( '( ) '( ) )iU c U c pβ> > .  
Suppose β=1. If water arrives with certainty on day 21, it is optimal to consume 
1/21st of the initial inventory each day until resupply.  Now suppose there is a nonzero 
probability of receiving water prior to day 21. Under uncertainty, initial consumption 
must be strictly larger than in the certainty case. For if not, the initial marginal utility 
would be weakly larger and, since the recursion requires that every subsequent marginal 
utility also be larger, the sum of the 21 contingent consumptions would no longer equal 
the initial inventory but would be smaller. Therefore, under uncertainty optimal 
contingent consumption initially must be larger than under certainty and, by a similar 
argument, must eventually be smaller than under certainty as the two panels in Figure 1 
illustrate. Intuitively, if there is some positive probability that the agent will be resupplied 
before day 21, it is optimal to consume more initially. However, in the event that water is 
not resupplied, this strategy requires (after day 9 in the illustration) that the agent cut 
back his consumption below what he would have done if he were certain there would be 
no resupply until day 21.  
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Figure 1: The Effect of Uncertainty on the Optimal Contingent Consumption Path 
 
No Uncertainty                                                         Uncertainty 
Re-supply Every 21st Day                                        Re-supply May Occur Before 21st Day 
 
 
In constructing Figure 1-4 we assume a period is one day, resupply on day 21 is 
assured (n=21) if it has not occurred before then and that if there is re-supply uncertainty, 
components of the alpha vector increase linearly from zero to one over the 21 days. The 
household is assumed to have a utility function of the form ( ) ( ) ,U c k c s θ= − where c 
represents daily water consumption. The parameter k is a scaling constant, s is some 
minimum level of consumption needed to maintain sanitary conditions and θ  is a 
measure of the curvature of preferences; the three parameters are chosen so that the utility 
function is strictly increasing and strictly concave.9  
 
3.3 How Availability of Emergency Water Affects Contingent Consumption 
Assume that emergency water is priced low enough that the consumer would 
utilize it some time before period n if resupply did not occur. Then, a reduction in the 
emergency price must cause the initial marginal utility to be strictly smaller, contingent 
                                                 
9 If the utility function is U(c)=k(c-s)θ it is straightforward to show that U’(c)>0 if kθ>0 and U’’(c)<0 if in 
addition θ-1<0.  We assume the following parameters in our simulations, k=-3194.37, θ=-1.0711, and 
s=152.8.  In addition, we use β=.999813, p=2.86 and pˆ =100 Pesos per 1000 liters. The selection of these 
parameters is described in Section 4. 
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consumption of municipal water to be larger in each period, and emergency water to be 
utilized (in the absence of resupply) at an earlier date. This in turn implies that the 
probability that emergency water is used is higher.10 
We illustrate these points in Figure 2. A decrease in the emergency price leads to 
uniformly larger contingent consumptions. Intuitively, the lower the cost of the 
emergency water, the more the agent is willing to risk running out of stored municipal 
water by depleting his stored water at a faster rate.  
 
 
                                                 
10 For, if on the contrary, instead a reduction in the emergency price caused the initial marginal utility to be 
weakly larger, then the recursion would imply that every subsequent marginal utility would be weakly 
larger than before, the strictly smaller emergency price would be reached at an earlier date, and hence the 
sum of contingent consumptions would be strictly smaller and would no longer match the unchanged initial 
inventory. So, the marginal utilities must instead be strictly smaller in every period and the contingent 
consumptions generating them must be larger than before the reduction in the emergency price. But then 
the water tank must be depleted sooner than before and the probability that emergency water will have to 
be used will be higher. 
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Figure 2: Optimal Consumption Path By Price of Emergency Water (in Pesos per thousand liters) 
 
 
3.4 How an Enlarged Storage Capacity Affects Contingent Consumption 
The effect of increased storage capacity on optimal contingent consumption can 
be deduced in a similar way. An increase in the initial inventory must cause the initial 
marginal utility to be strictly smaller, contingent consumption of municipal water to be 
larger in each period, and emergency water to be utilized (in the absence of resupply) at a 
later date.11 This in turn implies that the probability that emergency water is used is 
lower. 
 Figure 3 describes the optimal consumption paths and emergency water use for storage  
tanks ranging from 500 liters to 3500 liters. As capacity increases, it is optimal to increase  
contingent consumption uniformly and to postpone the first use of emergency water. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 For, if on the contrary, an increase in storage capacity caused the initial marginal utility to be weakly 
larger, then the recursion would imply that every subsequent marginal utility would be weakly larger than 
before, the unchanged emergency price would be reached at an earlier date, and hence the sum of 
contingent consumptions would be strictly smaller and could not equal the enlarged initial inventory. 
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Figure 3: Optimal Consumption Paths By Storage Tank Capacity (in liters) 
 
 
 
 
 
3.5 Expected Long-Run Consumption 
We can also use the model to determine the effect of storage capacity on expected 
long-run consumption of municipal and emergency water. Define a “state” as the number 
of days that have elapsed since the storage tank was last filled (0, 1,…, n-1). State 
transitions are generated by a first-order Markov process. Denote the probability of 
transiting in one step from state i to state j as for , 0,..., 1ijp i j n= − .    Then, 
0 1    1,0 , 1 1for 0,..., 2,  1,  and  1  for 1,..., 2. All other 
transition probabilities are zero. Since this Markov process is regular 
i i N i i ip i n p p i nα α+ − + += = − = = − = −  
(Grinstead and Snell, 1997), the probability that the system will be in each of the n 
possible states after T transitions converges to a limiting distribution asT . One way 
to determine this distribution is to note: for   
→∞
  i =1,...n-1, 
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0 1
0
P(c ) ( ) (1 ). That is, the probability that in the steady state 
is consumed equals the probability that in the steady state  is consumed and
and that there will then be  consecutive peri
i
i j ij
P c c
c
i
α== −∏
ods with no re-supply.
1
0 01
1
Since the  states are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, 
( )[1 (1 )] 1. From this last equation, ( ) can be deduced
 the other 1 probabilities of the stationary dis
n i
jj
i
n
P c P c
n
α− ==+ − =
−
∑∏
tribution. This derivation a
establishes that the stationary distribution is unique. Expected daily consum
                                                
 and, from that,
lso 
ption
(and its decomposition into consumption of municipal water and emergency water) are 
computed with respect to this limiting distribution. In particular, since each household 
finds it optimal to consume municipal water for an interval we can determine and then to 
switch to emergency water, we can use this limiting probability distribution to compute 
separately the expected daily consumption of emergency water and the expected daily 
consumption of municipal water in the long-run equilibrium.  
Figure 4 describes long-run expected daily consumption levels for agents with 
storage tanks of different sizes. As the figure reflects, increasing the capacity of storage 
increases average consumption, assuming the agent is capacity constrained. For a 
sufficiently (i.e. unrealistically) large storage tank, it is possible for the agent to no longer 
be capacity constrained.12  Figure 4 shows how expected daily consumption increases 
with increases in capacity. This same methodology with the Markov process can be used 
to calculate expected consumption for changes in other exogenous parameters such as 
changes in water prices.13 
 
 
12 As the storage tank increases, consumption on the period of resupply increases. The value of having 
additional water to consume in that period or later is . Provided that strictly exceeds the municipal 
price of water, it is optimal to fill the storage tank to capacity. Only if the storage tank is so large that 
 is it suboptimal to fill the tank to capacity. 
0'( )U c
0'( )U c p<
13  This steady-state distribution can no longer be used if it is assumed that uncertainty is eliminated since 
the Markov process is then no longer regular. However, when a group receives its water at regular 
intervals,,the stream of consumptions is deterministic and we can calculate the consumption path and 
resulting welfare directly. 
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Figure 4: Expected Consumption Levels by Storage Tank Capacity 
 
 
4. A Calibration Exercise Using Microdata from Mexico City 
4.1 Household Level Microdata 
We calibrate the model for Mexico City using household-level microdata from the 
Mexican National Household Survey of Income and Expenditure “Encuesta Nacional de 
Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares” (NHSIE) for 2005. The objective of the calibration is 
to capture the welfare characteristics of the current system and to quantify the social 
gains from moving to a system without uncertainty.  
The NHSIE is a nationally representative household survey administered by 
Mexico’s National Statistics Institute. The survey, which has been conducted 
approximately every two years since 1984, serves as the basis for calculating the Mexican 
Consumer Price Index and is widely used to construct measures of poverty and 
inequality. The survey is administered in person and the national participation rate in 
2005 was 88%. For our purposes, the NHSIE is valuable because it provides detailed 
information about household water usage, as well as household demographics and 
housing characteristics. With regard to water usage the survey asks households if they 
have running water, how often they receive water deliveries, if they have water storage, 
and typical monthly expenditure on water. 
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Households in Mexico City face great uncertainty about their water service. Water 
provision has long been a daunting problem in Mexico City and our analysis is 
particularly relevant to current policy aimed at extending water service to households on 
the edge of the city. Although most residents of Mexico City receive municipal water 
through pipes, often water is only available during particular hours of the day or days of 
the week.  In these cases water is turned on and off manually by special city water 
regulators called valve workers or ``valvulistas’’. Because of the cities permanent water 
shortage, as well as because of mechanical failures and human error, water service is 
notoriously unreliable.14   
In response to this uncertainty most households in Mexico City use some form of 
private water storage. The most common form of water storage is a rooftop tank known 
as a tinaco. In the NHSIE 44.78% of respondents reported having a tinaco. When this 
tank runs dry, households typically respond by purchasing water from a tanker truck. 
Trucks carry thousands of liters of water and can be hired to fill or partially fill household 
tanks. Tanker trucks are widely used in Mexico City because of the chronic uncertainty 
about water supply. Most of these trucks are privately-owned.15 The market for water 
delivery is highly-competitive with near marginal-cost pricing. In the empirical 
simulation, water delivered by tanker truck will serve as the backstop technology, the 
“emergency” source of water when stored water has been completely depleted. 
In Mexico City, municipal water and water from tanker trucks is used for bathing, 
cleaning, and sanitation, but not for drinking or cooking. Even in households with very 
limited resources, there is always a container of drinking water, typically 19 liters, known 
as a garaffón. These containers of drinking water are delivered door-to-door by either 
                                                 
14 Water supply problems receive constant attention in the local media. Dozens of recent articles in a major 
Mexico City newspaper, El Universal, describe chronic water shortages in neighborhoods in most 
neighborhoods in Mexico City.  See, e.g., “Fifteen Days Without Water Due to Pump Failure (Llevan 15 
Días Sin Agua Por Avería en Bomba)” July 8, 2005; “Water Shortage in Coyoacán is Denounced 
(Denuncian Escasez de Agua en Coyoacán)” February 28, 2007; “Fourteen Delegations Suffer Water 
Shortage (Padecen Escasez de Agua en 14 Delegaciones)” July 1, 2007; “Increased Requests for Water 
Trucks in the Del Valle Neighborhood (En la Del Valle, Mayor Petición de Pipas de Agua en Juárez” July 
23, 2007; “Residents of the Ajusco Neighborhood Refuse to Pay for Water They Don’t Receive (Se Niegan 
Vecinos de Ajusco a Pagar Agua Que No Reciben” December 16, 2007. 
15 In some remote neighborhoods at the edge of Mexico City running water is unavailable and municipal 
water is delivered by truck rather than by pipes. In these neighborhoods both municipal and private trucks 
provide water. In the sample of households from Mexico City in the NHSIE, 1.8% of households reports  
receiving water by truck. These households are ignored in the empirical simulation. 
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truck or cart, and the supply-side of this market is private and highly-competitive with 
few barriers to entry. In neighborhoods in Mexico City one often hears a gentleman 
yelling, “Agua, Aguaaaa!” as he drives through the street delivering these containers. 
Drinking water is virtually never used for non-drinking uses because it is much more 
expensive than either municipal water, which is piped in, or water from tanker trucks. In 
the empirical simulation that follows, we focus exclusively on non-potable water. 
Because drinking water is provided by a large number of highly-competitive private 
providers, there is virtually no uncertainty about drinking water availability in Mexico 
City. 
Since households do not drink or cook with municipal water, waterborne 
pathogens are much less of a concern. This is reflected in the news accounts we have 
examined. Municipal water provision in Mexico City features prominently in the local 
news, but in the several years of articles we examined the focus is overwhelmingly on 
water availability rather than on water quality.  See, e.g., “Residents of the Ajusco 
Neighborhood Refuse to Pay for Water They Don’t Receive (Se Niegan Vecinos de 
Ajusco a Pagar Agua Que No Reciben)” El Universal, December 16, 2007 and the 
articles cited in footnote 14. Accordingly, throughout the analysis we treat water quality 
as constant.  
Similarly, we assume that storage does not affect water quality. In many 
developing countries private water storage has been shown to be a major concern with 
respect to water quality (Kremer, Leino, Miguel and Zwane, 2006). This assumption is 
likely to be a reasonable approximation in the current application because the tinacos 
used to store water in Mexico City are sealed tanks, typically located on the roof and thus 
protected from most sources of contamination. Ninety-percent of the market for tinacos 
in Mexico is controlled by Rotoplas, a company that manufactures tinacos using heavy-
duty black plastic. Tank walls are constructed using a high-tech, multi-layered, anti-
bacterial surface that impedes the ability of microorganisms to reproduce inside the tank. 
In addition, the black color is important because it prevents light from entering the tank, 
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reducing microbial and algae growth.16 The fact that the tinacos are sealed also implies 
that evaporation is minimal. For use in other contexts, evaporation could be easily 
accommodated in our model. 
Thus, the private market has made considerable inroads in the water market in 
Mexico City. The market for drinking water has been completely taken over by private 
water providers. In the market for non-drinking water, the private delivery of non-
drinking water via tanker trucks provides a critical backstop technology, limiting the 
social costs of uncertainty in municipal water provision. The reason the private market 
has not evolved to play an even more important role in the market for non-drinking water 
is that tanker trucks cannot offer water at the municipal water price because of operating 
costs such as gasoline. Section 4.4 discusses water prices. Municipal water in Mexico 
City is supplied at 2.86 Pesos per 1000 liters, equal to the marginal social cost of 
supplying additional water through pipes. Even though the market for private water 
delivery from tanker trucks is highly-competitive, prices for water delivered by private 
tanker truck are still approximately 30 times as expensive as municipal water prices. 
More generally, although there would be a market for privately-provided piped-in water, 
the fixed costs of constructing and maintaining a water distribution network are large 
enough to have prevented private entry. 
 
 
4.2. Calibrating the Parameters of the Utility Function 
 In this subsection we solve the household’s utility-maximization problem to 
derive the demand function for water and its price elasticity.  We then calibrate the 
parameters of the utility function using the observed level of demand in the NHSIE and 
available estimates in the literature for price responsiveness. 
In the standard case in which a household chooses each period the optimal 
amounts of water and a composite commodity to consume given that it has income I and 
faces water price p (both expressed in units of the composite commodity), the optimal 
solution solves: 
                                                 
16 See “Rotoplas Paints Rooftops Black (Rotoplas, Pintan de Negro las Azoteas)” El Universal, March 15, 
2006 for more information about Rotoplas and the dominance of black plastic tanks in the water storage 
tank market. 
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For the threshold for minimum consumption, we use 40 liters of water/person/day 
following Gleick (1996).17 The households in the NHSIE sample in Mexico City have an 
average of 3.82 members per household implying s=152.8 (40 * 3.82). 
 The curvature parameter θ and the scaling parameter k are calibrated using 
available information about residential water demand. In particular, according the NHSIE 
data, among household in Mexico City who have water available all days per week, all 
hours per day, the average level of monthly expenditure on municipal water is 88.4 
Pesos.18 The municipal water price of 2.86 Pesos per thousand liters, which will be 
discussed in section 4.4, implies that these households consume on average 1013 liters of 
water per day.19  This provides a benchmark level for c*. Also, a meta-analysis of recent 
studies of residential water price elasticities, Dalhuisien, Florax, de Groot, and Nijamp 
(2003) find an average price elasticity of η=-.41.   
                                                 
17 Gleick (1996) cites the U.S. Agency for International Development, the World Bank, and the World 
Health Organization, each of which recommend 20-40 liters of water/person/day. Accordingly, later in the 
paper we will also report results based on 20 and 30 liters of water/person/day. Gleick describes minimum 
daily usage by end use. Our baseline value of 40 liters of water/person/day is consistent with his 
recommended basic requirement for bathing, cleaning, and sanitation. 
18 Households are asked about water expenditure twice in the NHSIE. Municipal water expenditure is 
included with expenditure on natural gas, electricity, and other utilities. Water expenditure is also elicited 
in a section about food and beverages. This presumably includes expenditure on drinking water. 
19 This is consistent with Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga (2002) who report that water consumption in Latin 
American cities ranges from 200-300 liters per day per person. 
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Using these two benchmarks, together with the demand function for water and the 
expression for the price elasticity, we solve for θ and k.  In particular, substituting (3) into 
(4) and rearranging yields 
*1 1
*
c s
c
θ η
−= + = − .07 . 
From (3), .3194
)*( 1
−=−= −θθ sc
pk  
 
The resulting utility function is increasing and concave in water consumption (see 
footnote 9) and can be used to compare the value of different levels of water consumption 
in units of the composite good. Finally, we use a daily discount rate β=.999813. This 
corresponds to  where r is the Interbank Equilibrium Interest Rate (TIIE) calculated by 
The Mexican Central Bank (Banco de México) as of 6/12/2007, a 7.705% annualized 
interest rate if compounded daily.20 In section 4.7 we consider alternative assumptions 
about the rate of time preference. 
 
4.3 Water Storage in Mexico City 
 There are several different sizes of tinacos used in Mexico City. Because of 
weight and size considerations, however, few households have tinacos larger than 1000 
liters. According to our conversations with hydraulic engineers in Mexico City, the most 
common size of tinaco in Mexico City is 750 liters. In our benchmark specification we 
assume that each household has 750 liters of water storage. In section 4.7 we evaluate the 
robustness of our results to alternative assumptions about tinaco size. As a point of 
comparison, notice that a 750-liter tinaco holds approximately 75% of what the average 
Mexican household would consume in a single day if it had continual access to municipal 
water. Hence, as long as water must be stored, consumption of water is inevitably 
restricted.  
                                                 
20 For calibration purposes we are setting , which will be true in equilibrium as long as households 
are consuming some of the composite commodity in each period.  In this case the marginal rate of 
substitution between consumption in period t and consumption in period t+1 is simply  and the price 
required to induce this consumption is 1+r. 
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This naturally raises the question of why households in Mexico City do not equip 
themselves with larger tinacos. For example, our earlier simulations suggest that a 5000 
liter tinaco would allow the household to almost perfectly smooth consumption.  
However, tinacos must be located on roofs to take advantage of gravity. The weight and 
volume of water which roofs can accommodate constitute limiting factors. Even 1000 
liters of water weighs 1000 kilograms or 2200 pounds, a weight requiring substantial 
structural reinforcement. Although our model does indicate that there are potentially large 
private gains from increased water storage, these practical limitations typically limit 
storage to approximately 750 liters. 
 
4.4 Water Service Uncertainty in Mexico City 
Table 1 describes the frequency of water deliveries across households in Mexico 
City. The NHSIE data reveal that 32.0% of households in Mexico City are subject to 
some form of water uncertainty and 10.4% receive water less frequently than once per 
day. This is consistent with Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga (2002) who report that over 
half of all neighborhoods in Mexico City routinely suffer cuts in service, with some 
residents, particular in the southern and southeastern portions of the city receiving water 
less than once per week.21 
The table also reports the percentage of households from each category who 
report having water tanks. Several comments are worth making. First, most households 
have water tanks, including homes which report having daily water deliveries. 
Households with water all hours all days are likely using their tinacos for water pressure 
purposes rather than for storage. Second, there is an overall pattern in which households 
with less frequent deliveries are more likely to have tinacos. This is particularly 
pronounced for households with extremely infrequent water deliveries.   
                                                 
21 We also examined delivery frequencies for the rest of Mexico and results are similar. Uncertainty is 
particularly prevalent in the Mexico’s central region where water is most scarce. Over thirty percent of 
households receive water less than once per day in the Mexican states Puebla (33%), Hidalgo (37%), 
Queretaro (44%), Nayarit (47%) and Morelos (47%). 
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Table 1: Households in Mexico City in the NHSIE  
 
                                Frequency           Percentage with 
                                                              Tinaco 
 
One day per week 2.8%                     95.2% 
Two days per week 2.1%                     86.7% 
Three days per week 3.8%                     68.8% 
Four days per week 0.2%                     80.0% 
Five days per week 1.3%                    100.0% 
Six days per week 0.2%                      50.0% 
Daily at limited hours 21.6%                    74.9%  
Daily at all hours 68.0%                    67.2% 
Note: Frequency of water deliveries comes from the 
NHSIE. The total sample includes 843 households. 
 
From these data we construct an alpha path describing water supply uncertainty 
for each household type. For households who receive water on average once per week, 
we adopt an alpha path of [1/7,  1/7,  1/7, ……]. Thus for these households, the 
probability that water is resupplied on day i is geometrically distributed with parameter 
1/7. 22 We treat households that report receiving an average of two deliveries per week as 
if they draw delivery times from a geometric distribution with parameter 2/7.  
In order to calibrate the model we also need water prices. Figure 5 describes 
residential water prices for 21 large cities in Mexico.23 The mean water price across cities 
is 3.94 Pesos ($0.35 in U.S. 2005 dollars) per 1000 liters. For the calibration we use the 
                                                 
22 To be consistent with the model we impose the condition that αn=1, for a value of n 
sufficiently large that the household is virtually certain to be resupplied before then Even 
for a household that receives water deliveries once per week, the probability of not being 
resupplied for n consecutive periods is less than 1 in 10 million. Although this results in a 
geometric distribution that is truncated on the right, its mean is only trivially less than 
that of its untruncated counterpart. 
23 National Water Commission (Comision Nacional de Agua), 2004. 
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price of municipal water in Mexico City of 2.86 Pesos ($0.25) per 1000 liters.24 As a 
point of comparison, according to Raftelis (2005), the mean residential water price in the 
United States is $1.17 per 1000 liters. 
 
Figure 5: Water Prices in Selected Mexican Cities 
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 Another important model parameter is the price of emergency water. As discussed 
in section 4.1, in Mexico City when municipal water does not arrive and households run 
out of water in their tinacos, they typically respond by purchasing water from a private 
water delivery truck. There is no comprehensive source of information for these prices, 
and in a review of newspaper articles we found prices ranging from 50-200 Pesos per 
1000 liters.25 Thus for the baseline emergency price of water we use pˆ =100 Pesos 
($8.88 in U.S. 2005 dollars) per 1000 liters. Later in the paper we also report results for 
pˆ =50 and pˆ =200. 
                                                 
24 We have confirmed this water price using actual residential water bills from Mexico City. It is also worth 
emphasizing that whereas there are relatively large differences in water prices across Mexican cities, water 
prices within Mexico City are highly uniform. 
25 For prices of water delivered by tanker trucks see "Those Affected by Leak Denounce Water Abuses 
(Afectados por Fuga Denuncian Abusos con Agua)", El Universal, June 8, 2008 and "Residents Protest 
Lack of Water: Eight Neighborhoods in Chimalhuacán Affected (Colonos Protestan por Falta de Agua: 
Ocho barrios de Chimalhuacán, Los Afectados)" El Universal, October 31, 2006. We also corresponded 
with Firdaus Jhabvala, water expert and director of the Center for Southeastern Research (Centro de 
Estudios de Investigación del Sureste)  and were provided in personal correspondence a price that is very 
similar to our baseline price of 100 Pesos per 1000 liters. 
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The emergency price of water is assumed to be exogenous. If the marginal cost of 
wate for tankr er trucks is not constant, one might have instead expected the emergency 
price of
timal Consumption under Uncertainty 
Our model enables us to determine the optimal contingent consumption vector for 
cludes consumption of municipal water 
tegy for households that on 
averag
 water to be correlated with the level of demand. For example, if the marginal cost 
curve is upward sloping, the price would fall when demand decreases. This is potentially 
important in our analysis because we want to be able to describe how welfare would 
change under alternative forms of water provision including programs that decrease water 
uncertainty and thus decrease demand for emergency water. Although data are not 
available to evaluate this possibility empirically, for a number of reasons we believe 
constant marginal cost is a reasonable approximation. Tanker trucks typically fill their 
tanks wherever water is available including municipal sources. Water is always available 
somewhere at the municipal price, and tanker trucks can fill their tanks and then travel to 
neighborhoods where water is not available. Furthermore, tanker trucks supply other 
users of water. For example, industrial customers and producers of drinking water 
demand water from these same sources and when emergency water demand shifts inward 
in our counterfactuals, demand for these other uses of water from tanker trucks does not 
shift. 
 
4.5 Op
  
each type of consumer. The optimal strategy in
and emergency water. Households rely on municipal water until they have exhausted 
their tinacos, and then consume water from emergency sources. At one extreme are 
households with such frequent water deliveries that they do not use emergency water at 
all. For example, households that receive water daily during limited hours are predicted 
to consume only municipal water because the emergency price of water exceeds the 
marginal utility of water consumption for these households. 
At the other extreme are households that receive water infrequently. For example, 
Table 2 describes the optimal contingent consumption stra
e receive water once per week.   
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Number of days 
since last delivery Daily Consumption (liters)
0 331.39
1 319.01
2 307.42
3 307.42
4 307.42
5 307.42
6 307.42
7 307.42
8 307.42
9 307.42
10 307.42
100 307.42
Table 2: Optimal Consumption Strategy
 
During the day of resupply and the following two days, such households consume 
at a decreasing rate their stored municipal water. Unless re-supplied, these households 
drain their tinaco during the third day after the last delivery, and supplement this stored 
municipal water with emergency water.26 After this one period of transition, they rely 
exclusively on emergency water until the arrival of the cheaper municipal water.  
If they followed this contingent strategy repeatedly, in the long run the probability 
of their being in each contingent consumption state converges to a stationary distribution 
(see section 3.5) with expected total consumption of 312.3 liters, 78.26 liters of which 
comes from the municipality. 
Table 3 describes expected long-run water consumption for households which 
receive water at different mean intervals. 68% of households have access to water at all 
hours and consume such that '( ) ,U c p=  implying daily household consumption of 1013 
liters per day. The remaining 32% of the households have less frequent water service and 
consume more emergency water but less water overall.  For example, households with an 
average of one delivery per week consume only about thirty percent (312.3/1013.0), of 
the water consumed by households that receive water daily at all hours. Most of the water 
consumed by these households is from emergency water sources rather than municipal 
water. Since only 96.9 liters of the 312.3 liters consumed daily (31%) comes from the 
municipality, the average price per liter paid for water by these households is very high, 
                                                 
26 Having consumed approximately 600 liters at that point, they would deplete the remaining 150 liters of 
their tinaco and supplement it with 43 liters of emergency water to provide the 193 liters of predicted 
consumption. 
 26
70 Pesos (per 1000 liters).  Overall, the average price paid for water, 7, far exceeds the 
municipal price of 2.86.  Table 3 demonstrates that water uncertainty severely lowers 
water consumption, particularly for households that receive water only a few times per 
week.   
Table 3: Water Consumption in Mexico City 
Average Number of 
Deliveries per Week
% of 
Households 
(NHSIE)
Average Daily 
Total 
Consumption in 
Liters (Simulation)
Average Daily 
Consumption from 
the Municipality  in 
Liters (Excluding 
Emergency Water, 
Simulation)
Average 
Price Per 
1000 Liters 
Paid for 
Water 
(Pesos)
1 2.84% 312.3 96.9 70
2 2.08% 328.9 179.7 47
3 3.78% 358.1 257.7 30
4 0.19% 376.4 319.9 17
5 1.33% 400.9 375.8 9
6 0.19% 489.1 473.4 6
Daily at limited hours 21.55% 750.0 750.0 3
Daily at all hours             
(water available 
continuously) 68.04% 1013.0 1013.0 3
Weighted Averages
- 887.1 873.6 7
 
 
The severe reduction of water consumption observed in Table 3 provides a 
possible explanation as to why the government tolerates the haphazard delivery of water. 
Infrequent and uncertain deliveries of water reduce average water consumption, 
providing a mechanism for allocating scarce water without raising the price or inducing 
queues. One might call the regime “rationing by shadow price.” If water were always 
available, the price p would generate excess demand. Uncertainty can be seen either as an 
inevitable product of this shortage, or as a strategy used by the water administrator to 
allocate water in the presence of the shortage.27 The costs of the system, the large 
inefficiencies which are so inequitably distributed, are largely hidden.  
                                                 
27 An interesting dynamic issue may arise when uncertainty is used as an explicit strategy for addressing 
excess demand. Suppose, for example, that an exogenous increase in population increases demand for 
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4.6 The Welfare Comparison 
The model can be used to examine the welfare implications of alternative modes 
of water provision. We first consider providing water at regular, equally-spaced intervals 
to the 32% of the households who currently receive water haphazardly; the remaining 
households would continue to receive water at all hours. Second, we consider providing 
water continuously to all households. Unlike the first counterfactual, the second requires 
a modest increase in the price of municipal water in order to keep total water 
consumption equal to water consumption under the status quo; we assume that an equal 
share of the increase in these revenues is rebated to each household as a lump-sum 
transfer. 
In the first counterfactual, we normalize the time between deliveries for all 
households not currently receiving continuous water provision. Instead of some 
households receiving water once a week and others receiving seven times per week, we 
assume that all households receive water at the same time interval. This reduces the large 
differences between households. In addition, by providing the water at fixed intervals, 
households are able to perfectly smooth water consumption, eliminating the inefficiency 
caused by uncertainty.   
The first counterfactual is implemented as follows.  Notice that in the status quo, 
68% of households receive water continuously.  It would be politically difficult and 
extremely expensive to move these households to a system without continuous water 
provision because this would require these households to purchase and install tinacos.  
Instead, for the first counterfactual we continue to provide water continuously to these 
households, but normalize the delivery interval for the remaining 32% of households.  
The model implies a total level of water consumption for any given such interval. We 
select the delivery interval (every 31.2 hours) such that total water consumption under the 
first counterfactual is equal to total water consumption under the status quo. Notice that 
                                                                                                                                                 
water above the available supply at the fixed municipal price.  In order to address this excess demand, the 
water administrator increases the level of uncertainty of provision. However, this may cause households to 
respond by increasing storage capacity. This further increases demand, leading the water administrators to 
implement an additional increase in the level of uncertainty. 
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the first counterfactual requires: (1) no water price increase and (2) no additional 
infrastructure.28   
The second counterfactual we consider is providing water to all households daily 
at all hours of the day. This counterfactual completely eliminates the need for the private 
storage of water, freeing households from future purchases of tinacos and related 
maintenance expenses. Furthermore, such a system is efficient, because it equates the 
marginal utility of consumption across all households and time periods. Under the second 
counterfactual all households consume the same amount of water and have the same level 
of utility. 
Moving to a system of continuous water provision at current water prices will 
cause water consumption to increase. In this application, at current water prices all 
households would consume 1013 liters per day. However, it may be the case that existing 
water supply sources and/or the municipal distribution infrastructure is not sufficient to 
meet this increase in demand. Indeed, as mentioned before, this lack of supply is one of 
the primary public rationales for the current system. 
Instead, it is more reasonable to ask how high the price would need to be in order 
to maintain average water consumption at the same level while making water available at 
all hours. Under the current system, the average household consumes 887 liters per day, 
873.6 liters per day from the municipal system. In order to implement a system where 
water is provided at all hours but maintains this level of demand, it is necessary to raise 
the price of municipal water to p* such that  '( *) *U c p= where c* = 873.6. In our 
application p*=4.12 Pesos ($0.37 dollars).29 At this price total consumption of municipal 
                                                 
28  Average daily consumption of municipal water is 873.6 liters per day, but that average is elevated by the 
inclusion of that segment of the populace which has water available continuously. The remaining 31.96% 
of the residents must cutback their usage over time to make do until the next delivery arrives and then 
sharply raise their usage, on average consuming municipal water at a rate of 577.3 liters every 24 hours. 
Hence, if these residents were all certain that their 750 liter tinaco would be  resupplied every 31.2 hours, 
they could consume indefinitely at the steady rate of 577.3 liters per day, thereby smoothing their 
consumption perfectly.  
29 The price increase causes municipal revenue to increase. In order to facilitate the comparison with the 
status quo, we return this increased revenue to households in a lump-sum transfer equal to the average 
increase in expenditure per day, equal to mean consumption per day*(new price per unit--initial price per 
unit) = 873.6*(.00412-.00286)=1.1 Pesos per day or, present discounted value of 5907 Pesos. This 
assumption only negligibly affects the reported measures of welfare gain, and changes none of the 
qualitative results.   
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water is the same as it is under the status quo. This represents a 44% increase over the 
original municipal price.30  
Table 4 describes the main results of the welfare comparison. Again results are 
reported separately by household type. Average consumption levels and welfare gain 
(loss) for the first counterfactual are reported in columns (3) and (4).  The results from 
this counterfactual demonstrate that there are large social gains from moving to a system 
of water provision which normalizes delivery times across time and across households. 
The average total lifetime gains per household are 9,382 Pesos ($833 dollars).  Part of 
this large welfare gain comes from the reduction of uncertainty. Without supply 
uncertainty, households are able to perfectly smooth water consumption and obtain 
higher utility. These gains are largest for households that have the least number of 
deliveries per week under the status quo.   
These large welfare gains also result from a substantial redistribution across 
households, toward households for which the marginal utility of consumption is high.  
For example, under the current system, households with one delivery per week are 
extremely constrained compared to households with access to continuously available 
water. These households have the most to gain from a system of water provision without 
uncertainty because they are able to consume substantially higher levels of water and 
avoid outcomes in which they must consume emergency water at high prices.   
Not all households are made better off under the first counterfactual. In particular, 
households which already were receiving daily water service (during limited hours) are 
made worse off because they receive water less frequently. Nonetheless, the loss 
experienced by these households is small compared to the welfare gain from households 
who under the status quo received water less frequently. The new system equilibrates 
water consumption across households for a large overall increase in utility. 
Under the second counterfactual total utility is even higher. Average consumption 
levels and welfare gain (loss) for the second counterfactual are reported in columns (5) 
and (6). Relative to the status quo, the average welfare gain is 11,264 Pesos ($1,000 
                                                 
30 Notice, however, that while the municipal water price increases, the average price paid for water actually 
decreases. In the status quo described in Table 3, households consume water from the municipality and 
water from emergency sources. However, in the counterfactual, households do not consume the higher 
priced water from emergency sources because the marginal utility of water after consuming water from the 
municipality is lower than the price of emergency water. 
 30
dollars). Whereas the first counterfactual reduced differential allocation of water across 
households, the second counterfactual treats all households identically. Again, there is 
one group of households that is made worse off.  In particular, households who under the 
status quo had continuous access to water are made worse off because of the price 
increase. Notice, however, that the loss in welfare for these households is small relative 
to the gain for other households. Because the second counterfactual is efficient, it would 
be possible with an appropriate system of lump-sum transfers, to make all households 
strictly better off.31 
Although our first counterfactual garners nearly as much welfare gain as the 
second counterfactual and is much cheaper to implement, one caveat should be kept in 
mind. Our assumption that consumers have identical marginal utility schedules and 
identical sized tinacos contributes to our finding since, under this assumed homogeneity, 
the policy of uniform deliveries completely eliminates the distributional inefficiency 
among 32% of the households. To the extent that this group is heterogeneous, an 
inefficiency would remain under this policy and the resulting welfare gain might be 
smaller. 
 
                                                 
31 In our simulations, we assume that providers of emergency water receive no lump-sum transfers. 
Although these providers would be put out of business once the cheaper municipal water became available 
on a daily basis, they would not be worse off unless they had been earning rents due either to market power 
or to scarce capacity. If they were earning such rents, there would be revenues sufficient to compensate 
these providers as well as the consumers. This follows since the second counterfactual is distributionally 
efficient. 
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Table 4: The Welfare Implications of Alternative Modes of Water Provision 
 Status Quo Counterfactual #1 
Households type 1-7 provided 
water at same interval  
(every 31.2 hours)  
Counterfactual #2 
Water Provided Daily at all 
hours to all households, with a 
price increase to clear market  
      
Average Number of 
Deliveries Per Week 
Average Daily Water  
Consumption from the  
Municipality (in liters) 
Average 
Daily Water 
Consumption 
(in liters) 
Welfare Gain 
(Loss) 
Relative to 
Status Quo 
Average 
Daily Water 
Consumption 
(in liters) 
Welfare Gain 
(Loss) 
Relative to 
Status Quo 
   (in Pesos)  (in Pesos) 
      
1 96.9 577.3 156,539 873.6 163,331 
2 179.7 577.3 116,012 873.6 122,804 
3 257.7 577.3 82,376 873.6 89,169 
4 319.9 577.3 55,152 873.6 61,945 
5 375.8 577.3 34,375 873.6 41,167 
6 473.4 577.3 17,899 873.6 24,691 
Daily at limited hours 750.0 577.3 (5,370) 873.6 1,421 
Daily at all hours (water 
available continuously) 
1013.0 1013.0 0 873.6 (430) 
Weighted Averages 873.6 873.6 9,382 873.6 11,264 
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Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis 
     
    
    
Welfare Gain Relative to Status 
Quo (in Pesos) 
 
Water Provided Daily at all hours to all 
households, with a price increase to 
clear market 
     
     
Baseline Estimate  11,264 
     
Rate of Time Preference (7.705% annualized rate)  
 5.0% annualized rate   15,760 
 10% annualized rate   8,066 
     
Minimum Consumption Level  (40 liters/person/day)  
 30 liters/person/day (s=114.6)   9,763 
 20 liters/person/day (s=76.4)   8,317 
     
Curvature Parameter (θ=-1.071)    
 θ=-.90   19,838 
 θ=-1.2   8,486 
     
Tinaco Size (750 liters) liters 
 500 liters  15,475 
liters 1000 liters  9,449 
 1500 liters  7,756 
 750/1000 liters  9,793 
   
Emergency Price (100 Pesos per 1000 liters)   
 50 Pesos per 1000 liters 7,235 
 200 Pesos per 1000 liters 17,449 
   
Note: This table reports the main results for 13 different sets of model parameters. For each specification, 
the table reports the average annual gain in household welfare that corresponds to a transition to a system 
of water provision in which water uncertainty is removed and the price of water is increased in order to 
clear the market (the last column in table 4). Baseline parameters are indicated in parentheses. Amounts 
are in 2005 Pesos. For 2005 dollars divide by 11.26. 
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4.7 Sensitivity Analysis 
 Sections 4.5 and 4.6 provide results for our baseline parameters. In this subsection 
we examine the sensitivity of the results to alternative parameter choices. For each 
specification, the table reports the average annual gain in household welfare that 
corresponds to a transition to a system of water provision in which water uncertainty is 
removed and the price of water is increased in order to clear the market (the last column 
in table 4). Overall, the results are relatively insensitive to minor changes in the 
parameters. 
First, table 5 reports the simulated change in welfare under alternative 
assumptions about the rate of time preference. The baseline results use a daily discount 
rate of  where r is the Interbank Equilibrium Interest Rate (TIEE), a 7.705% 
annualized interest rate if compounded daily. The TIEE is the most commonly used 
interest rate in Mexico. Although the TIEE is a valuable starting point, it is valuable to 
examine how the results change with alternative assumptions about β. Although home 
and car loans are widely-available in Mexico City, credit cards and other forms of 
household credit are less common than they are in the United States. In particular, many 
households in Mexico City do not have easy access to credit at the relatively-low TIEE 
rate. For a 10% rate the change in welfare is 8,066 Pesos (28.4% lower). For 
completeness, we also considered an alternative specification with a lower interest rate. 
For a 5% annualized rate the change in expected discounted welfare is 15,760 Pesos 
(39.9% higher). 
 Second, table 5 reports the change in welfare under alternative values for s, the 
minimum consumption level. Recall that in the empirical simulation utility from water 
consumption in each period is k(c-s)θ where s is the threshold for minimum daily 
consumption. For the baseline value for s we use 152.8 which corresponds to 40 liters of 
water/person/day. For 30 and 20 liters of water/person/day the change in welfare is 9,763 
Pesos (13.3% lower) and 8,317 Pesos (26.2% lower). With smaller minimum 
consumption levels the change in welfare is smaller because the household consumes less 
water with and without uncertainty. 
 Third, we considered alternative values for θ, the curvature parameter. Recall that 
in our utility function both k and θ are negative so utility is increasing and concave in 
 34
water consumption. In our baseline specification we used θ=-1.071 and for alternative 
specifications we adopted -0.9 and -1.2. With -0.9 the change in expected discounted 
welfare is 19,838 Pesos (76.1% higher) and with -1.2 the change in welfare is 8,486 
(24.7% lower). Increasing the curvature parameter (away from zero) causes the marginal 
utility of water consumption to decrease more quickly, increasing the motive for 
consumption smoothing and decreasing the level of water consumption under both 
certainty and uncertainty.  
 Fourth, we consider what happens to the change in welfare when we change 
tinaco size. In the baseline specification we assume that all households have 750 liters of 
water storage. Although the NHSIE asks households whether they have a tinaco or not, it 
does not ask households about tank size. As discussed in section 4.3, there are practical 
considerations, most importantly weight, that provide limits on tank size in most 
dwellings. Still, the model implies that households, particularly in neighborhoods facing 
severe uncertainty, have large incentives to increase their storage capacity and indeed 
some households in Mexico City have gone to greater lengths to store water privately, for 
example, by constructing underground tanks that are connected to the rooftop tinacos.  
 Table 5 reports the welfare change relative to the status quo for alternative 
assumptions about tinaco size. We consider the cases with 500, 1000 and 1500 liter 
tinacos. Although 1500 liter tinacos are very unusual in Mexico City, this counterfactual 
is useful for understanding how the model works and for simulating a case in which 
households have some form of additional water storage capacity in addition to tinacos.  
As expected, the welfare gains from eliminating uncertainty are decreasing in tank size. 
With 1500 liter tinacos the welfare gain from eliminating uncertainty is 7,756 Pesos 
(31.1% smaller). 
  
This counterfactual still ignores, however, the likelihood that in reality customers 
with different needs for storage may have purchased tinacos of different sizes. Most 
tinacos used in Mexico City are produced by a company called Rotoplas. Though 
evidence from our interviews indicates that 750 liter tinacos are the most popular, 
Rotoplas produces several different sizes of tinacos including 500, 750, 1000, and 1100-
liter models. We would expect this choice of which tinaco to buy to be correlated with the 
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irregularity of service. Not allowing for this heterogeneity in the simulation likely biases 
upward our estimates of the welfare costs of uncertainty because the households with the 
most to gain from increased capacity would be among the first to invest in larger tanks. 
 
Table 5 provides evidence about the potential magnitude of this bias. In this 
counterfactual, we assume that there are two different tinaco sizes, 750 and 1000 liters. 
Furthermore, we assign systematically the larger tinacos to households with the greatest 
need for storage capacity. In particular, households who receive water 1-4 days per week 
are assigned 1000-liter tinacos and households who receive water 5-6 times per week or 
daily at limited hours are assigned 750-liter tinacos. Under this counterfactual the present 
value of the expected welfare gain relative to the status quo is 9,793 Pesos (13.1% lower). 
However, since the average capacity across households in this specification is 22.2 liters 
larger than in the benchmark, a small part of this 13.1% results from the increase in the 
average tinaco size.32 As expected, increasing tinaco size for these households decreases 
the gain relative to the status quo because these households are better able to smooth 
consumption under uncertainty.  
 
 Finally, we consider the effect of changing the price of emergency water. For the 
baseline emergency price we use 100 Pesos per 1000 liters of water. As discussed above, 
however, in practice the price of water from tanker trucks ranges from 50-200 Pesos per 
1000 liters. As demonstrated in table 5, the emergency price has the expected effect on 
household welfare. For emergency prices of 50 Pesos per 1000 liters, households use 
municipal water more freely, are better able to smooth consumption and the welfare gain 
relative to status quo is 7,235 Pesos (35.8% smaller). For an emergency price of 200 
Pesos per 1000 liters, the expected discounted welfare gain is 17,449 Pesos (54.9% 
larger). 
 
                                                 
32 Since the expected present value of the welfare gain if every household had a tinaco of 772.2 liters is 
11,056 Pesos, the pure effect of introducing heterogeneity is to lower the welfare gain by 11% rather than 
13%.  
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5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper has examined the welfare costs of water delivery uncertainty.  
Municipal water administrators are afraid to raise water prices (see Timmins 2002), and 
supplying water infrequently offers one mechanism for eliminating the excess demand 
caused while pricing below the market clearing level. These systems are particularly 
popular in the developing world where the political pressure to keep water prices low is 
strong. Unfortunately, there are large welfare costs from water supply uncertainty and 
these costs are borne by those with infrequent deliveries and/or smallest storage 
capacities. 
The problem with supply uncertainty is that it prevents water from being allocated 
to the buyers who value it the most. In this paper we described a model of water 
consumption in which households solve a dynamic optimal consumption problem in the 
face of uncertainty about the availability of water. Misallocation may frequently occur in 
this context, with one household desperate for water while another is allocating water to 
frivolous uses. And yet, without a market mechanism there is no way that the parched 
family can acquire the water the other family is wasting. We described the properties of 
the model, demonstrating how the introduction of uncertainty, changes in emergency 
water prices, and changes in storage capacity affect water consumption and welfare. 
We then calibrated the model using household-level microdata from a random 
sample of households in Mexico City in order to measure the welfare costs of uncertainty 
in a typical water system. We solved the model for a set of representative households and 
quantified the social gains from moving either to a two-tier system where everyone now 
storing water would receive deliveries at the same frequency or to a system where all 
households have access to water at all hours. The results demonstrate that the gains in 
distributional efficiency from reliable water service are very large in magnitude. 
Moreover, most of those gains can be achieved simply by normalizing the delivery 
schedules of those now storing water so that the frequency of deliveries is the same for 
these households. This can be achieved without costly changes in infrastructure, price 
increases, or rebates.  
In future work it would be interesting to consider how our results would change if 
we adopted a collective model of household behavior. The current model assumes that 
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the household acts as a single decision-maker (the so-called “unitary” model) rather than 
as a collection of individual decision-makers, each pursuing his or her self-interest (the  
“collective model”). See, e.g. Fortin, Bernard and Guy Lacroix (1997). Intra-household 
interactions would likely exacerbate the inefficiencies from water supply uncertainty. In 
each period, every household member would consume water out of the tank until his (or 
her) marginal benefit of consuming one more unit of water currently is equal to his 
discounted marginal cost of having one less unit of water in the tinaco next period. 
However, since water in the tinaco is shared with other family members, each individual 
would bear only a fraction of the full future cost of removing water from the tank. This 
would lead to aggregate overuse of water in the tinaco relative to the unitary case---a 
within-household tragedy of the commons; as a result, the household would bear even 
larger costs during periods of limited water availability. The model of Levhari and 
Mirman (1980), formulated to study the subgame perfect equilibrium of a two-player, 
finite-horizon  multistage game where simultaneous extraction depletes an otherwise 
expanding fish stock, is easily specialized to our no growth case of pure depletion and 
generalized to any finite number of extractors from a common pool. Whether this model 
can also be adapted to our infinitely repeated stochastic environment remains for future 
work. If their model could be adapted, one could repeat the exercises we perform here. 
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